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BOOK REVIEWS
time has been spent by Cooper in the preparation and assembling of these
materials, as evidenced by several hundred cases advantageously used to
emphasize his opinions. The author has used clear and concise language.
He has approached the subject matter from a very practical point of view.
In my opinion Mr. Cooper's book would serve a useful purpose in the
library of the student, the practitioner and the theorist.
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1932-1949: THE SUPREME COURT'S USE OF A CONSTITOOL. By Virginia Wood. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1951. Pp. ix, 436. $6.00.
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This is a valuable study of the work of the Court in an era in which a
substantial percentage of its work has been concentrated during the past
two decades and in which there are fewer than usual signposts in the Contitution to guide the justices in their deliberations. The principal purpose
of Professor Wood in her analysis of the Court's interpretation of the
due process clause is to demonstrate that the "Constitutional Revolution"
of 1937 was already well under way five years earlier insofar as this part of
the Constitution was concerned. Emplo)ing the categories of the freedoms
of the First Amendment, socio-economie legislation, criminal proceedings,
administrative actions and the tax power, she finds that in each of these
areas the Court had laid down the precedents which enabled it in 1937 and
thereafter to build a new structure of values for due process.
While it has been generally recognized that the pre-Roosevelt Court
considerably extended the scope of the due process clause to the freedoms
of the first amendments and the rights of the accused in criminal proceedings, this reviewer for one had not fully realized that in the other areassocio-economie legislation and administrative action (the dividing line here
being most tenuous)-the great majority of decisions favored the states in
the first four or five years of the period under consideration. Starting with
Justice Sutherland's statement in Stephenson v. Binford (1931) that the
Court would not overrule the legislative judgment as to the necessity of a
given economic policy, Professor Wood builds up a line of decisions in
which the Court displayed willingness to permit a greater degree of economic
experimentation by the states. She states that after 1932 "generally speaking,
a majority of the justices . . . had held that our constitutional system does
not require judicial protection of the free enterprise, laissez-faire system."
There are, it is true, few exceptions to this statement but the pattern
they seem to form is interesting and has not been noted by Professor Wood,
although she has written that they are some of the most momentous
decisions of the 1930's. The exceptions as listed by the author are Carter v.
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Carter Cod Co., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, Railroad
Retirement Board Y. Alton R.R., and Morehead v. Tipaldo (a fifth much
less important case is Thompson v. Consolidated Utilities Corp.). It is
worth noting that the first three of the important four involve federal legislation and that the subject matter in the Carter, Tipaldo and Alton cases
is the employer-employee relationship. In her list of decisions favorable to
the legislatures prior to 1937 Professor Wood has none applying to the
employer-employee relationship and only one involving a federal law. There
is some indication, therefore, that the justices, while permitting the legislatires to regulate more aspects of business, such as minimum prices, were
still reluctant to allow substantial alteration of the existing relationship
between employer and employee or to permit the federal government to
widen its sphere of economic regulation. The employer-employee relationship represented the last citadel of laissez-faire which the Supreme Court
almost perished in defending
The other purpose-that of showing that the present Court is as lacking
in definite standards and is as capricious as the pre-1932 Court in its use
of the due process clause-is a more familiar one but the author has accomplished it quite skillfully, especially in the area of criminal proceedings.
She has collected a number of beautifully impressive clauses by which the
Court has sought to explain what the Constitution guarantees to the individual in a criminal proceeding in a state court. Due process is said to be
"the consensus of society's opinion," to comprise "fundamental notions of
fairness and justice embedded in the feelings of the American people," to be
a "compendious expression of all the rights which are basic to a free society,"
and to require procedures compatible with "the immutable principles of
justice which inhere in the idea of a free government." In such circumstances the author says the Court may select "its rule from among a
number of alternatives, all equally vague and general. It applies the rule
to the indefinite phrase 'due process of law' and the result can be protection
or no protection without contradictions."
But this is not a new position for the Court, which has always tried to
protect through the use of this clause that which it felt to be reasonable
and fair. The post-1932 justices simply have had different standardsstandards which permit substantial economic regulation, broad use of state
taxing power, a freer hand for state administrative agencies and more
protection for the individual's political and civil liberties.
As is frequently and perhaps inevitably the case in studies of the Court
we are told only what the Court did; the more important question of why
the Court did it is for the most part left unanswered. Professor Wood had
briefly referred to the economic pressures of the depression and to the
political pressures of 1937. She has made a very cursory examination of the
philosophies of three-Black, Douglas and Frankfurter-of the twenty-one
justices who sat on the Court during this period. But she has not found it
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possible within the scope of this book to analyze deeply the reasons for the
changing use of the due process tool. A partial explanation lies in the fact
that the legislatures and the justices saw eye to eye on most matters during
these years. Equally important is the conviction on the part of most of the
justices that the Court in these areas should not try to substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature. As the pressure of international tensions
drives legislatures to more incursions on the freedoms of the first amendment the Supreme Court will perhaps be forced to reveal which of these
explanations is sounder. Decisions of the last few years apparently indicate
that the majority of the Court, though doubtful of the wisdom of certain
ideas, will find nothing in the Constitution to prevent their enactment.
Two small omissions slightly impair the usefulness of this book. The
absence of an introductory chapter summarizing the development of due
process in the field of economic legislation prior to 1932 handicaps the
non-specialist who is unacquainted with the judicial history of the previous
half-century. This is only partially overcome by occasional references to
several of the leading cases of the past. The other deficiency is the lack
of a table showing the number of cases decided in each category in each
year and whether the decision was favorable to the governmental action.
Certainly the quantitative approach has its limitations but here it would
be a justifiable supplenent to the qualitative analysis. This reviewer found
himself much more convinced of the early tendency toward change in the
economic field after constructing one for himself.
DR. THOMAS J. WOOD
AssoCiATE PROFESSOR Or COVENMNT
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FREE ENTERPRISE AND T=E ADMINISTRATIVE STATE.

By Marshall E. Dimock.

University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1951. Pp. 179. $2.50.
The author, a teacher of political science in several of the outstanding
universities of this country and Puerto Rico, who is also a writer of many
worth-while books on business, government, administrative agencies and
political enterprises, approaches the subject with a wealth of personally
gained knowledge, experience and study.
He approaches the subject by first establishing his interpretation of
"Free Enterprise" as the system in which the predominant characteristics
are individual ownership, competition, and managerial freedom, and the
"Administrative State" as the control of economy by government or by
public administration.
The book deals with a series of related problems and is divided into
five "essays" (as the author chooses to designate them) or chapters: the
free enterprise system, what it is and what causes it to change; the problems
of monopoly and antitrust laws, with the conclusion that administrative
factors will be the center of any lasting solution; consideration of the

